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Introduction 
 
 
Physical co-presence may no longer appear to be a pre-requisite for political campaigns (Earl 
and Kimport 2011), but mass public demonstrations continue to be central to the repertoires 
of dissent networks and protest movements (Carty, 2011). Images of these demonstrations 
shared on social media not only help protesters build a counter-narrative to that promoted by 
traditional media, but may also raise questions about the policing of such incidents while 
simultaneously ÔhumanisingÕ those groups that experience political oppression (Reilly, 2015). 
These images were frequently shared on social media during recent high-profile mass public 
demonstrations such as the Egyptian ÔrevolutionÕ in January 2011 (Gerbaudo, 2012) and the 
anti-Putin demonstrations in Russia in early 2012 (Oates, 2013). The connective affordances 
of sites such as Facebook and Twitter have helped dissent networks mobilise Ôaffective 
publicsÕ through the use of protest frames that can easily be personalised by users and shared 
with their online social networks (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Papacharissi, 2015). These 
publics are able to express their emotional connection and solidarity with protest movements 
through actions such as Ôre-tweetingÕ and ÔlikingÕ social media content (Papacharissi, 2015).  
This has implications for the traditional media ecology through the unprecedented 
opportunities afforded to these non-elite actors to challenge dominant media narratives and 
make their own contributions to the Ôpolitical information cycleÕ (Chadwick, 2013).  
 
However, a Ôcyber realistÕ critique of these so-called Ôsocial media revolutionsÕ has suggested 
that the use of these tools has made it easier for both democratic and non-democratic states to 
identify and arrest protest leaders (Morozov, 2011). For example, Turkish authorities have 
increasingly targeted social media sites such as Twitter and YouTube since the 2013 Gezi 
Park protests in Istanbul, even going so far as to prevent their citizens from accessing these 
services during high-profile public demonstrations (Gen, 2014). The pervasiveness of state 
surveillance of the Internet was further highlighted by documents leaked by US National 
Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden in June 2013, which revealed details of the 
PRISM programme whereby US intelligence operatives were collecting information on 
activists who operate in these online environments (Zuckerman, 2015). This suggests that 
researchers might be exposing Ôunaware participantsÕ to potential punitive measures by the 
state through the verbatim reproduction of their online comments in academic publications.  
 
Clearly social media provide researchers with new opportunities to investigate the affective 
dimension of contemporary protest movements. Such work requires scholars to combine big 
data approaches with more in-depth analyses of how socio-political contexts shape and 
influence the outcomes of online activism. It also raises some important ethical concerns for 
researchers, particularly in relation to the extent to which qualitative online research should 
be sensitive to its specific offline context (Eynon, Fry and Schroeder, 2008). The Ôdo no 
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harmÕ principle suggests that researchers should be cognisant of the specific threats deriving 
from local contexts and work towards minimising the potential harm to participants 
(Markham et al., 2012). This paper sets out to add to the emergent literature on online 
research ethics by exploring the ethical implications of researching the use of social media to 
organise protests in Ôpost-conflictÕ Northern Ireland. Specifically, it will explore how an 
ethical stance was constructed for the study of loyalist flag protest pages on Facebook in 
January 2013. These protests against the decision to alter the flag protocol of Belfast City 
Hall were viewed as a Ôlightning rodÕ for loyalist dissatisfaction with the peace process, as 
well as a manifestation of their increasing alienation from their unionist political 
representatives. Loyalist flag protest pages, such as the Loyalist Peaceful Protest Updater 
(LPPU) that is the subject of this paper, would be subject to increased scrutiny by the police 
as a result of a high court injunction in January 2013, which followed death threats that had 
been posted against an unidentified Catholic man in North Belfast. At the same time, critics 
of the flag protests such as the self-styled Ôparody groupÕ Loyalists Against Democracy 
(LAD) began to use social media to highlight the sectarianism of the protesters. Their 
mocking of loyalist tropes, which often appeared to focus on the poor spelling and grammar 
of the protesters, was criticised by some commentators for further reinforcing negative 
stereotypes of working class loyalist communities. It was in this context that the comments 
posted on public Facebook pages during the peak of the flag protest movement were 
investigated. This paper presents an overview of the literature on the ethical approaches 
towards the study of protest movements on social media sites such as Facebook and outlines 
the ethical stance that was implemented in this study of the LPPU page.  
 
 
Ethical Dilemmas in researching the use of social media by protest movements 
 
The study of the use of social media by protest movements presents ethical dilemmas for 
researchers at two different stages in the research process, namely data collection and the 
presentation of results.  
 
Data collection from Facebook and the issue of consent 
 
A key issue to consider at the start of any study of online protest is whether data collection 
itself might expose protesters and their supporters to potential harm. Is it ethically appropriate 
for researchers to freely download content, metadata and personal information from group 
and individual social media pages or does it breach the privacy of these unaware participants? 
In order to address this question, researchers must first consider whether social media content 
should be treated as a published text or the property of human participants. Early research 
into online communities in the nineties suggested that there was no need to seek informed 
consent from online commentators due to the public nature of the sites to which they 
contributed (King, 1996). The most influential guidelines for online research ethics in the 
ÔWeb 2.0Õ era have encouraged researchers to either seek informed consent or anonymise 
datasets in order to protect social media users from any harm that might occur from the use of 
their data (British Psychological Society, 2007; Markham et al, 2012). That is not to say that 
all subsequent research involving social media datasets has conformed to these standards. 
Rather, studies of the role of Twitter during the popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia in 
January 2011 identified individual users in data visualisations and reports without having 
sought their permission to do so in advance (Lotan et al, 2011). This was presumably justified 
on the grounds that these users tended to be public figures, such as journalists, rather than 
members of the public who lacked the resources to manage any reputational harm that might 
  3 
have occurred as a result of their identification in these publications (Kozinets, 2010). 
However, concerns have continued to be expressed about whether such strategies inflict 
unnecessary harm upon these unaware participants (Krotoski, 2012). It may also be expediant 
for researchers to evaluate the risk to these online communities on a case-by-case basis given 
that expectations of privacy are likely to vary between different social groups (Nissenbaum, 
2010).  
 
Facebook, the subject of this paper, might be characterised as a Ôsemi-publicÕ site because it 
not only hosts private and public groups, but also requires users to register their details in 
order to avail of its full range of services (Sveningsson Elm, 2009). This presents significant 
challenges to users who are required to negotiate the different audiences that view their 
content on this site, a concept known as Ôcontext collapseÕ (Baym and boyd, 2012). Recent 
work on usersÕ perceptions of privacy on Facebook has suggested that most people see such 
online social spaces as Òloci of public display rather than private revelationÓ (Burkell et al. 
2014: 974). This tendency for users to expect a certain degree of scrutiny of their ÔprivateÕ 
social networking profiles by strangers would appear to provide implicit consent for 
researchers to ÔlurkÕ on Facebook and report verbatim what they observe without the need to 
ask permission to do so. 
 
However, a closer inspection of FacebookÕs Terms of Service reveals that users are expected 
to obtain informed consent when collecting information from other Facebookers and to 
explain how it will be used; the exception being content published using the public setting, 
which is freely available for Òeveryone, including people off Facebook, to access and useÓ 
(Facebook, 2015). This raises the question of whether researchers should post ÔResearch in 
ProgressÕ signs that inform members of these online communities about their intention to 
collect social media data. Clearly this may increase anxiety amongst supporters of online 
protest movements who already suspect that their comments are being scrutinised by the 
police and the media. In such circumstances the researcher might have to respond to 
accusations that they are increasing the risk of inflicting reputational harm to these 
individuals within their respective communities (Zimmer, 2012). A related concern might be 
that this awareness of being monitored could hinder the expression of dissent that was the 
focus of the research, with some users reluctant to post information that might incriminate 
them (Farrimond, 2013). Therefore, researchers may have no choice but to opt for some form 
of covert observation in order to capture the conversations between activists on Facebook, 
including those that mention the surveillance of these sites by the police. 
 
 
Presentation of Results 
 
Covert observation must be accompanied by the anonymisation of datasets in order to 
minimise the risk of potential harm to unaware participants on Facebook. This typically 
involves the removal of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as username, age or 
gender that could lead to the identification of those users responsible for online comments. 
However, there remains the possibility that these users can be re-identified if other 
information pertaining to the identify of these individuals is not redacted, as was seen with 
the information disclosed on cohort size that revealed Harvard College as the anonymous 
University that featured in the ÔTastes, Ties and TimesÕ (T3) project in 2008 (Zimmer, 2012). 
Internet Search engines such as Google can also be used to locate those users responsible for 
direct quotes that feature in academic reports (Markham, 2012). Although search engines 
cannot directly access Facebook content, new applications such as Graph can be used to 
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identify the authors of content quoted in research publications even when the researchers 
have sought to remove all personal identifiable information (Trevisan and Reilly, 2014). This 
limits the ability of the researcher to guarantee full anonymity when citing social media 
content verbatim. It also might bring those who use the social networking site to mobilise 
mass public demonstrations to the attention of the police and other intelligence agencies in 
both democratic and non-democratic states. 
 
The direct quotation of Facebook content in order to illustrate key themes from the 
conversations about protest movements on the site may therefore prove problematic, with the 
exception of those that cannot be found using search engines. Researchers must therefore 
consider what level of disguise they are willing to bestow upon these unaware participants in 
the presentation of results (Bruckman, 2002). Markham (2012) suggests that they should 
create composite accounts that illustrate the broad themes that emerge from social media 
datasets without reproducing verbatim what individual users have said on these sites. 
However, this fabrication strategy has the potential to distort and manipulate the voices of 
marginalised groups, such as protest movements, that often receive very little mainstream 
media coverage. A medium-cloaked approach towards data anonymisation, which uses 
selective direct quotes and paraphrases the words of unaware participants in order to protect 
them from harm, would appear better suited towards the study of these groups online 
(Kozinets, 2010). For example, word visualisations and the use of quotes that could not be 
traced back to their original authors were deployed to illustrate key themes from a recent 
study of the public Facebook pages of UK disability rights groups. Congruent with the 
participatory ethos of disability studies, it was decided that the focus should be on Òwhat was 
said instead of trying to establish who said itÓ (Trevisan and Reilly, 2014, p. 1143). This 
paper will explore these ethical dilemmas by drawing on the lessons from a study of loyalist 
flag protest pages on Facebook in January 2013.  
 
 
The Union Flag Dispute, December 2012- March 2013 
 
On 3
rd
 December 2012, Belfast City Council voted in favour of a new protocol that would 
see the UKÕs union flag fly over City Hall on 18 designated days rather than all-year round, 
as had been the previous policy. The Alliance Party, who had proposed designated days as a 
compromise between unionists and nationalists, bore the brunt of unionist and loyalist anger 
at the decision with the home of two of its councilors attacked, its Carrickfergus office 
destroyed in a suspected arson attack and a death threat made against East Belfast MP 
Naomi Long (Melaugh, 2013). The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) were accused of Ôwhipping up hatredÕ towards the Alliance Party by 
distributing 40,000 Ôanti-AllianceÕ leaflets to households across Belfast a few weeks prior to 
the vote, which encouraged people to contact Alliance representatives to voice their 
opposition to the proposed changes to the flag protocol (Kane, 2012). Yet, none of Northern 
IrelandÕs political parties could have anticipated the scale of the protests seen across the 
region between December 2012 and March 2013 (Guelke, 2014). The ÔpeopleÕs protestÕ was 
in fact coordinated by a number of loyalist actors that opposed the peace process and were 
critical of the failure of the unionist parties to block the new flag protocol. These included 
newly formed political organisations such as the Ulster PeopleÕs Forum, members of loyalist 
paramilitary groups including the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in East Belfast, and Ôprotest 
provocateursÕ such as loyalist activist Jamie Bryson, former British National Party 
fundraiser Jim Dowson, and victimsÕ campaigner Willie Fraser.
i
 The repertoire of this often 
chaotic protest movement consisted of marches to and from Belfast City Hall, the picketing 
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of public buildings and street protests that illegally blocked roads and caused significant 
disruption to commuters and local businesses (Nolan et al, 2014). The Northern Ireland 
Confederation of British Industry estimated the loss of revenues to Belfast traders at 
between £10 million and £15 million, as customers stayed away from the city centre due to 
the number of protest rallies held there during the festive period.
ii
  
 
Although the majority of the flag protests passed off peacefully and without incident, a 
minority ended in violent clashes between loyalists and the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI). Baton rounds would be used to disperse rioters who had thrown petrol 
bombs at police officers during violent disturbances in towns such as Carrickfergus and 
Newtownabbey in January 2013. The police were also attacked by loyalist mobs for six 
consecutive nights near the sectarian interface that separated the predominantly nationalist 
Short Strand district from the surrounding loyalist community of the Lower Newtownards 
Road in East Belfast (Melaugh, 2013). Senior members of the UVF were said to have 
orchestrated this violence and were held responsible for a gun attack on police officers in 
East Belfast on the 5
th
 January.
iii
 These incidents arguably marked a turning point in the 
protests as the PSNI made clear that it would no longer facilitate illegal street protests and 
warned the rioters that they would face prosecution. Whereas the protests had attracted 
10,000 people at their peak between 17 and 23 December 2012, numbers dwindled to less 
than 1,000 people per week between mid-January and March 2013 (Nolan et al, 2014,p. 60). 
Nevertheless, the cost of policing the protests and related incidents throughout this period 
was estimated by the PSNI Chief Constable Matt Baggott to be as high as £20 million.
iv
 A 
total of 147 police officers were reportedly injured during the flag protests, with 246 
protesters arrested and 188 charged with committing offences between 3 December 2012 
and 31 January 2013.
v
 
 
The Flag Dispute: the final straw for loyalists? 
 
Many observers felt that the union flag dispute was a Ôlightning rodÕ for loyalist 
dissatisfaction, not only with the performance of the power-sharing institutions at Stormont 
Ð the seat of Northern IrelandÕs devolved administration- but also with the peace process 
itself (McDonald, 2013). The decision by Belfast City Council to alter the flag protocol was 
viewed by working class loyalists as yet another republican attack upon unionist and loyalist 
culture (Guelke, 2014). The flag was seen a symbol of their ÔBritishnessÕ that they felt was 
being Òairbrushed from the ÔnewÕ Northern IrelandÓ (INTERCOMM & Byrne, 2013,p. 7). 
First Minister Ð and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party- Peter Robinson was 
condemned for having Ôsold outÕ these communities through his participation in the power-
sharing Executive with Sinn Fein and his failure to protect loyalist communities from this 
Ôculture war.Õ This was symptomatic of an ever increasing disconnect between the main 
unionist parties and working class loyalist communities (Nolan, 2014; Novosel, 2013). 
Loyalists believed that they had not yet seen the economic and political benefits of peace 
(often referred to as the Ôpeace dividendÕ) that had been experienced by their nationalist and 
republican counterparts (Smithey, 2013). ÔTruth recoveryÕ investigations were characterised 
as republican conspiracies that were designed to discredit the British state due to the fact 
they almost exclusively focused on atrocities committed by the police and army. Such an 
approach towards dealing with the past was perceived by loyalists as an attempt to valorise 
and justify the republican Ôarmed struggleÕ (McGrattan, 2012). Interviews conducted with 
those who participated in the flag protests also revealed a deep distrust of the PSNI and the 
news media (Nolan et al, 2014). Loyalists complained that they had been subject to police 
brutality during the flag protests while a Ôlight touchÕ approach had been adopted towards 
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the policing of protests organised by nationalist residentsÕ groups. There were also 
complaints about a biased local media that had focused only on the violence perpetrated by 
loyalist mobs, with very little coverage of the protests that had been attacked by nationalist 
residents (INTERCOMM & Byrne, 2013). The metaphor most commonly invoked by the 
protesters was that the flag dispute was the Òstraw that broke the camelÕs backÓ (Nolan, et al, 
2014,p. 96).   
 
The Ôculture warÕ narrative was disputed in the 2014 Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring 
Report, which showed that the number of loyalist bands and parades in Northern Ireland had 
reached record levels by 2013 and that they continued to receive generous subsidies from 
the EU Peace III Programme (Nolan, 2014,p.162). However, these cultural expressions of 
loyalism might have increased in frequency due to fears about the further erosion of unionist 
and loyalist culture. The perceived failure to address such victimhood, whether real or 
imagined, has arguably been a defining characteristic of the post-violence society created by 
the Belfast Agreement (Brewer, 2010). The peace accord might have transformed the nature 
of the Northern Irish conflict (colloquially known as the ÔTroublesÕ) but it did not resolve it 
with zero-sum perceptions of politics and space held by members of rival communities left 
largely undisturbed (Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008; Wilford and Wilson, 2003). The rationale 
was that ethnic divisions could not be Ôwished awayÕ and that the leaders of the main 
political parties, many of whom had already proven adept at using discourses of Ôimagined 
hurtsÕ to mobilise their constituents during the conflict, would legitimise the Agreement by 
extolling its virtues to their respective ethnic blocs (Murtagh et al, 2008). The frustration 
expressed by the loyalist flag protesters between December 2012 and March 2013 would 
appear to militate against such a scenario. Although designated days was proposed by the 
Alliance Party as a compromise between unionist and nationalist positions on the flying of 
the union flag over Belfast City Hall, working-class loyalist communities saw it as further 
evidence that their concerns were being completely ignored by the political establishment 
(Nolan et al, 2014).  
 
Social Media and the Flag Protests 
 
Social media played a key role in the coordination of the first wave of flag protests in 
December 2012. Facebook pages such as ÔSave the Union FlagÕ were used to share 
information about the street protests that spread across Northern Ireland in the weeks 
following the controversial vote on the flag issue in Belfast City Council. These pages were 
also used to highlight alleged PSNI brutality against the loyalist protesters. Whether 
platforms such as Facebook had a significant impact upon the course of events remains to be 
seen. Indeed, it has been argued that social mediaÕs most important contribution to the flag 
protest movement was the way in which it Òprovided a central nervous system for the 
communication of feeling and construction of solidarityÓ between the protesters  (Nolan et 
al, 2014, p.70). The zero-sum perceptions of politics held by loyalists were strengthened by 
the polarised and sectarian discourses surrounding the flag issue that circulated on social 
media. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of incidents of online sectarian 
abuse being reported by young people (Young, 2014). One such incident would result in two 
loyalist Facebook pages, Loyalists Against Short Strand and Loyalist Peaceful Protest 
Updater, being shutdown after it emerged that threats were posted against a Catholic man.
vi
 
Such threats prompted Justice Minister David Ford to call on the PSNI to monitor sites like 
Facebook in order to identify and prosecute those who had used them to post hate speech or 
incite others to commit criminal acts.
vii
  In this context, it was perhaps no surprise that flag 
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protesters perceived sites such as Facebook and Twitter as not being safe spaces to exchange 
information about the demonstrations (Nolan et al, 2014).  
 
 
Social media also helped mobilise those affective publics who wished to express their 
frustration at the violence and disruption caused by the protests. Most notably, Belfast 
resident Adam Turkington created the hashtag #OperationSitin in response to the loyalistsÕ 
#OperationStandstill, encouraging people to stand up to the protesters by supporting 
businesses in Belfast that have suffered a massive downturn in trade due to the disruption 
caused by the protests.
viii
 However, self-styled Ôparody groupÕ Loyalists Against Democracy 
(LAD) would emerge from the flag protests as one of the most prominent critics of the flag 
protesters.
ix
 The anonymous Ôpro-unionÕ group was heralded by political commentator 
Newton Emerson as the Ôonline sensation of the yearÕ for their use of Facebook to share 
sectarian and offensive comments posted by loyalists online.
x
 Supporters praised LAD for 
holding up a mirror to the Ònaked sectarianism, bare racism and transparent illoyalism of the 
protestersÓ (Spencer, 2013). They would also share a number of memes such as ÔBelfast 
BigotÕ under the hashtag #flegs, mocking the protestersÕ pronunciation of the word ÔflagsÕ.
xi
 
Such activity was said to have generated much hurt and anger amongst loyalists, who 
organized mass reporting campaigns to force Facebook to remove the page.
xii
 LAD was 
accused of reinforcing middle class stereotypes of working class loyalists through their 
constant focus on the poor spelling and grammar of those who left comments on the flag 
protest pages (Mulvenna, 2013). Yet it is clear that the satire of LAD did play a key role in 
exposing the narratives of anti-Agreement loyalists that were often overlooked by the news 
media. This study set out to add to the limited empirical data available on this issue by 
focusing on the ways in which Facebook was used to articulate the perceived grievances of 
the flag protesters. The Loyalist Peaceful Protest Updater (LPPU) page was selected for 
analysis due to the aforementioned high court injunction that named it as one of the key 
organisational hubs for the flag protest movement. This paper focuses specifically upon the 
ethical stance that was constructed for the aforementioned study.  
 
Constructing an ethical stance for the study of flag protest pages  
 
Whiteman (2012) argues in favour of localised ethical stances that are informed not only by 
the ethical guidelines of organisations such as the British Psychological Society, but also by 
the socio-political context in which data is collected and analysed. Having already 
established that content published on this public Facebook page could technically be used 
without the permission of its authors, the first ethical dilemma related to whether the LPPU 
administrators should be notified about the researcherÕs intention to collect and analyse this 
data. Like with the posting of a ÔResearch in ProgressÕ notification, there were concerns that 
contacting the administrators might inhibit the expression of dissent on the page, perhaps 
even leading to restrictions being placed on which users could view and contribute to. 
Previous research suggested that young people in particular were likely to use SMS text 
messaging to organise anti-social behaviour in contested urban interface areas in 
circumstances when their social media profiles were subjected to greater surveillance by 
local community groups, the media or the PSNI (Reilly, 2012). It was considered highly 
likely that many of those who contributed to the LPPU page might do the same if they were 
made aware of the presence of the researcher. Subsequent interviews with loyalists would 
reveal that many were indeed wary of exchanging information about the flag protests on 
public Facebook pages that might be used to incriminate themselves or other protesters 
(Nolan et al, 2014). Hence, it was decided to covertly observe the conversations between 
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users on the LPPU page in order to explore the narratives of loyalists who have felt 
increasingly marginalised and isolated within Ôpost-conflictÕ Northern Ireland.  
 
Data Collection and Preliminary Findings 
 
 
Text-mining software package Discovertext (www.discovertext.com) was used to collect 
and archive 16,203 posts on the LPPU page between 2
nd 
and 22
nd
 January 2013. This period 
included a number of key events in the flag dispute including #OperationStandstill and the 
related #OperationSitin campaigns, as well as the violent clashes between police and 
protesters in East Belfast that were seen as a turning point in the policing of protests.  Most 
Facebook users (2096 out of 3,991) posted only once on the page during this period, with 
the LPPU administrator responsible for the most comments (1725 posts). It was difficult to 
verify the representativeness of these comments given that the page appeared to have been 
heavily moderated throughout this period.  
 
It was decided to focus on 3899 Facebook posts that related to the three ÔpeaksÕ in activity 
on the page during this period (see Figure 1). These reflected key stages in the flag protest 
movement, such as the decision to move to white-line protests, which are explored in more 
detail below.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of comments on Loyalist Peaceful Protest Updater page, January 2013 
 
 
The six stages of critical thematic analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke (2013), which start 
with the initially reading of the posts and end with the identification of key themes from the 
dataset, were thus implemented for this corpus in March 2013. Although a full overview of 
these themes is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that there was some 
evidence to corroborate the findings of previous research into the experiences of the flag 
protesters (see INTERCOMM & Byrne, 2013; Nolan et al, 2014). The page administrators 
provided logistical information, such as the time and location of demonstrations relating to 
#OperationStandstill, and used Facebook to explain changes in strategy, such as the move 
from blocking roads to white-line protests that dominated discussion on the page on 17
th
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January. There were also frequent allegations of police brutality towards the flag protesters 
on the page, most notably on 12
th
 January when cyber loyalistsÕ vented their anger at video 
footage that appeared to show an unprovoked assault upon a pensioner by several police 
officers during one of the demonstrations in Belfast city centre.
xiii
 This ÔpoliticalÕ policing 
was viewed as one manifestation of the Ôculture warÕ against unionist and loyalist culture 
perpetrated by Sinn Fein via a compliant and biased news media. The DUP and UUP were 
heavily criticised on the page for failing to articulate the concerns of working class loyalists 
in relation to these issues. This alienation from mainstream unionist parties was further 
illustrated by the angry response of loyalists to a speech in which DUP East Antrim MLA 
Sammy Wilson challenged their claims that they had not benefited from the Ôpeace dividendÕ. 
While the page administrators expressed personal support for the UVF-affiliated Progressive 
Unionist Party and the anti-Agreement Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), the majority of 
posters characterised the movement as ÔpeopleÕs protestsÕ. The analysis also provided further 
evidence of the lack of cohesion in the organisation of the flag protests, as illustrated by the 
accusations that the leadership had told the media about the change in strategy towards white-
line protests before they had consulted their grassroots.  
 
Managing potential reputational harm for unaware participants 
 
The next step was to consider how best to convey these themes without exposing participants 
to potential reputational harm. The critical thematic analysis provided some evidence of the 
Ôvirulent sectarianismÕ that was said to be circulating on these Facebook pages during the 
peak of the flag protest movement (Nolan et al, 2014). For example, some users characterised 
the residents of the nationalist Short Strand enclave in East Belfast as Ôfenian bastardsÕ or 
ÔtaigsÕ, sectarian terms of abuse for Catholics in Northern Ireland, after violence flared near 
the sectarian interface in East Belfast on 5
th
 January. There were also claims that there were 
Ôtoo many CatholicsÕ in the PSNI, particularly when unsubstantiated rumours circulated 
suggesting that many of the Tactical Support Groups deployed in East Belfast were in fact 
members of the An Garda Sochna, the police service of the Republic of Ireland. There were 
also several hostile exchanges between loyalists and republicans on the LPPU page that 
involved the trading of sectarian insults. However, these interactions were not typical of those 
observed on the page throughout this period. The page administrators appeared to have acted 
quickly to delete presumably offensive or threatening comments from threads on the page. In 
addition, they frequently urged users not to respond to Ôrepublican trollsÕ and to be careful 
about what they were posting, after threats against an unidentified Catholic man on the page 
had led to its temporary closure via court order in January. Loyalists were warned that they 
were vulnerable to the Ôonline shamingÕ of parody group LAD, who had been taking 
screenshots of comments posted by users on the page and sending these to their employers.  
 
The repeated warnings about the visibility of posts on the LPPU page might provide a prima 
facie justification for the use of direct quotes from these participants. As observed in previous 
research into public perception of online privacy (Burkell et al, 2014), it is reasonable to 
presume that these users were aware that their comments were likely to be scrutinised by a 
range of external actors such as the news media, PSNI and critics of the flag protest 
movement. The risk of exposing these participants to potential police prosecution for posting 
offensive or threatening comments appeared negligible. In his evidence to the House of 
Commons Northern Ireland Select Committee on 16 January 2013, then PSNI Assistant Chief 
Constable Drew Harris reported that much of the online abuse reported during this period did 
not meet the Ôstandard of proofÕ necessary for criminal prosecution.
xiv
 Recent scholarship has 
also challenged the notion that data anonymisation is the best way to protect online 
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participants from any harm that might arise from the use of their content in academic 
publications. Scholars such as King (1996) and Whiteman (2012) argue that researchers 
should educate users about how to deal with the blurring of the boundaries between private 
and public in online spaces rather than protect them. It also might not be appropriate to 
ÔpleaseÕ online participants by adopting measures, such as the removal of PII and the 
paraphrasing of their comments, that preserve their anonymity and stop them being held to 
account for their views (Herring, 1996). Yet, the researcher was still wary of adopting 
presentation strategies that might have the same effect as the online shaming of loyalists by 
groups such as LAD, which was said to have contributed to the hurt and alienation felt within 
working-class loyalist communities (Mulvenna, 2013). In this context, there appeared to be a 
convincing case for focusing on the narratives that were present on these pages rather than 
those individuals who articulated them in specific posts.  
 
A key question was whether it was necessary to use direct quotes in order to represent the 
perceived grievances of loyalists that underpinned the flag protest movement. Clearly the 
Facebook comments of prominent loyalist activists, such as Jamie Bryson, could provide an 
insight into how key decisions, such as the move to white line protests, were communicated 
to the protesters. The verbatim reproduction of their comments could also be justified on the 
basis that they were Ôpublic figures,Õ that presumably had little or no expectation that their 
comments would remain private. However, the same argument could not be made for those 
users who did not have the resources to withstand the potential reputational harm that might 
occur if they were to be identified in academic publications through the use of their posts 
(Krotoski, 2012). This might further alienate working-class communities who already felt 
that they were the victims of a ÔwarÕ perpetrated by Sinn Fein against unionist and loyalist 
culture. There was also the strong possibility that such an approach might persuade these 
users not to contribute to public Facebook pages in the future, thus depriving researchers of 
valuable insight into loyalistsÕ experiences of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland.  
Therefore, it was decided that it would be appropriate to use direct quotes from leaders of the 
flag protest movement while taking measures to protect the anonymity of Ôrank and fileÕ flag 
protesters. This was an approach that was congruent with the medium-cloaked approach 
towards data anonymisation espoused by Kozinets (2010).  
 
Data anonymisation without distorting the voices of flag protesters 
 
It was important to ensure that the voices of these flag protesters were not distorted through 
the process of data anonymisation. Hence, the ÔfabricationÕ strategy proposed by Markham 
(2012) was ruled out due to its manipulation of user comments that might further disempower 
the loyalist flag protesters. The use of word clouds appeared to be a more effective way of 
illustrating key themes from the LPPU page without compromising the privacy of these 
unaware participants.  This Òethically soundÓ approach towards the qualitative investigation 
of social media datasets, which requires the data to be ÔcleanedÕ to remove PII and ÔfunctionÕ 
words prior to the creation of the visualisation, has already been deployed to investigate the 
discussion of personal stories on the Facebook pages of UK disability dissent networks 
(Trevisan and Reilly, 2014). The online word cloud generator Tagul (www.tagul.com) was 
used to visualise the most frequently used words in the comments posted on the LPPU page 
during January 2013 (see Figure 2). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
these results in more detail, the visualisation highlighted key words associated with the 
lexicon of the ÔpeopleÕs protestÕ, such as ÔUlsterÕ, ÔLoyalistÕ and ÔUnionÕ (presumably a 
reference to Northern IrelandÕs constitutional status within the United Kingdom). The 
prominence of words referring to locations such as Belfast City Hall and Short Strand also 
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illustrated how much of this online activity was driven by offline events such as the violence 
seen in the vicinity of the nationalist enclave in East Belfast over several nights during this 
period. There was some evidence of loyalist hostility towards the PSNI through the 
appearance of words such as ÔPSNIRA.Õ 
 
 
Figure 2. Words most frequently used in comments posted on Loyalist Peaceful Protest 
Updater page, January 2013 
 
 
 
There were however some important limitations to the use of word clouds that should be 
acknowledged. Firstly, the focus on word frequency provides no insight into the context in 
which these words are used on the page (McNaught and Lam, 2010). During the union flag 
protest, it would be difficult to establish with a high degree of certainty whether words such 
as ÔpeaceÕ were being used as a critique of the Northern Irish peace process or to call for 
loyalists to keep their protests peaceful. A related concern would be how these word clouds 
fail to capture the hostile interactions between loyalists and republicans on the LPPU page. 
Indeed, the word cloud provides very little insight into the key themes identified during the 
critical thematic analysis of the dataset, such as the sectarian language used to describe the 
Short Strand residents and the lack of consensus in relation to the strategy adopted by the flag 
protesters. This would appear to militate against the use of word clouds to illustrate the 
perceived grievances of the flag protesters that were expressed on public Facebook pages. 
However, they may still be valuable tools for the study of protest groups online.  The 
highlighting of the most frequently occurring words using tools such as Tagul may help 
researchers familiarise themselves with the content and make it easier for them to construct 
themes that emerge from the analysis from social media datasets.  
 
In light of the limitations of the data presentation strategies outlined above, it was decided 
that it would be appropriate to paraphrase the comments of Ôrank and fileÕ protesters in order 
to protect them from any reputational harm that might arise from their identification in the 
study. While acknowledging that it was not possible to fully guarantee the anonymity of the 
participants, this would at least ensure that the narratives of these loyalists were not distorted 
while allowing the researcher to place their comments in context. It would also allow for the 
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exploration of the perceived grievances of loyalists that were said to have underpinned the 
flag protest movement.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Social media provides unprecedented opportunities to gain insight into the affective 
dimension of contemporary protest movements, and, in particular, how social media enables 
citizens to express solidarity and emotional connection with these campaigns. This raises a 
number of ethical dilemmas for researchers, particularly in relation to whether ÔpublicÕ posts 
on sites such as Facebook can be used without the permission of their authors. While covert 
observation may be justified on the basis that ÔResearch in ProgressÕ signs might inhibit the 
expression of dissent on these pages, the identification of these users through the verbatim 
use of their posts might expose them to the surveillance of the police and other intelligence 
agencies. Thus, a medium cloaked approach towards data anonymisation, which only uses 
direct quotes that cannot be located via conventional search strategies, might be appropriate 
in order to protect unaware participants from any reputational harm that might arise from the 
use of their data.  
 
This paper focused on how best to convey the narratives of loyalists who posted on the LPPU 
page without exposing them to potential reputational harm. The flag protests were viewed as 
a Ôlightning rodÕ for loyalists who felt increasingly alienated from their political 
representatives and disenchanted with the peace process. They also expressed their anger at 
what they saw as a Ôculture warÕ that was being waged by Sinn Fein against unionists and 
loyalists via a ÔbiasedÕ news media. Public Facebook pages, such as the LPPU, provided 
valuable insight into how such grievances fed into the protests against the decision of Belfast 
City Council to alter its flag protocol. The covert observation of the page in January 2013 
found some evidence to support the suggestion that social media had become a Ôsectarian 
battlegroundÕ during the flag protests. This created an ethical dilemma for the researcher in 
terms of what level of anonymity should be afforded to those who posted this content on the 
page. Page administrators constantly warned users about the visibility of their posts, while the 
risk of criminal prosecution should they be identified appeared relatively low. It was 
recognised that the researcher had no obligation to ÔpleaseÕ these participants by protecting 
them from any reputational harm that might have arisen from their identification. Yet, the 
researcher was wary of inadvertently contributing to the online shaming of loyalists by 
groups such as LAD, which was said to have further alienated loyalists. Conceivably this 
might also have convinced some users not to post on public Facebook pages, depriving 
researchers of the valuable insight into the perspectives of loyalists. Therefore, the researcher 
decided to only use direct quotes from public figures, such as the leaders of the flag protest 
movement, who would presumably have no expectation that their comments would remain 
private. The narratives of the Ôrank and fileÕ protesters were conveyed through the use of 
direct quotes that could not be traced back to their authors and the paraphrasing of their 
comments. In light of the limitations of alternative strategies such as fabrication and word 
clouds, this was the most appropriate way to illustrate the themes from the LPPU without 
distorting the voices of these users. While for some this might seem like a very strict ethical 
stance, this reflected the specific socio-political context in which the data was collected and 
analysed. Data presentation strategies for the study of protest movements on social media 
should ideally be made on a case-by-case basis, with researchers reflecting upon the potential 
reputational harm that might be inflicted on unaware participants through the use of their 
data.   
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i
 Protest provocateurs travelled from one protest site to another and were often asked to speak 
ii
 The NI CBI called for Belfast City Council to provide financial assistance to traders 
experiencing difficulties. For more, see: http://www.u.tv/News/Baggott-to- -flag-protest-
threat/406e382b-833f-4a63-aaaf-8fa8b5bfe919 
iii
 For more see: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/07/senior-uvf-figures-belfast-
violence 
iv
 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/apr/03/union-flag-protests-arrested-northern-ireland 
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v
 Police Federation spokesperson Terry Spence provided these statistics. For more see, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22781555 
 
vi
 The man was not identified due to legal reasons. For more, see: 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/facebook-loyalist-
flag-pages-shut-down-29039564.html 
vii
 “Flag protests: Loyalty no excuse for violence, says police chiefÓ.  BBC, 12 December 
2012. Available at: 
 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐northern‐ireland‐20622185 (accessed on 10 August 2014) 
 
viii
 http://www.itv.com/news/update/2013-01-11/belfast-hits-back-with-operation-sit-in/ 
ix
 The group has used the name LADFLEG. LAD was its chosen moniker during the period 
under review. 
x
 EmersonÕs original piece featured in the Sunday Times. It was later reproduced on the LAD 
blog and can be accessed here: http://loyalistsagainstdemocracy.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/real-
online-wonder-of-year.html  (accessed on 10 August 2014) 
xi
 The Belfast Bigot meme was based on footage of a female loyalist protester shouting no 
surrender through a broken window during the controversial flag vote at the City Hall on 3 
December 2012. Further information on this meme and #flegs can be found here: 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/northern-ireland-flag-protests-2012-13 (accessed 
on 10 August 2014) 
xiiThe  LAD  page  was  published  and  unpublished  by  Facebook  six  times  between  its 
launch on the 10th December 2012 and the 6th October 2013.  
  
xiii
 The man captured on camera was subsequently charged with two counts of disorderly 
behaviour and assaulting a police officer. Loyalist claims that he was a pensioner were also 
later refuted in the news media.  
xiv
 The full transcript of his statement can be found here: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmniaf/877/130124.htm 
 
